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After the emergence of the Internet, an interesting 
question arises that what is its impact on the firms’ 
channel and pricing strategies. This paper applies game 
theory to study the strategic interactions between rational 
manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, and it generates 
the following results: 1. The presence of the Internet 
allows imperfectly competitive manufacturers to better 
coordinate their pricing, targeting, and channel strategies, 
thereby minimizing the agency costs involved in common 
dealing at the traditional outlets, which in turn enhances 
the manufacturers’ profits. 2. Exclusive dealing may and 
may not become more prevalent in the presence of the 
Internet. It all depends on the ratio of the population of 
switchers to the entire population of consumers. 3. The 
presence of the Internet allows a monopolistic 
manufacturer to screen consumers by serving different 
people at different outlets. Screening is less effective, 
however, in the case of imperfect competition. 4. A 
dynamic adjustment process is obtained which describes 
how a manufacturer should optimally change his channel 
and pricing strategies when the population of the Internet 
purchasers grows over time. 
 
1. Introduction  
The prevalence of the Internet brings a great deal of 
business opportunities and potential markets. For one 
thing, manufacturers do not have to rely on retailers to sell 
their products to final consumers. Through the Internet, 
they can directly contact worldwide consumers and have 
better understanding about what consumers want and need. 
Similarly, retailers can also serve consumers that they 
could not have reached otherwise. However, by making 
searching easier for consumers, the Internet is said to 
intensify price competition. For example, Bakos [1] 
suggests that lower search cost on the Internet would lead 
to more severe price competition and lower profits. 
Brynjolfsson and Smith [2] show empirically that the 
price competition on the Internet is sharper than that in 
traditional channels for standard products like CD and 
books. However, some scholars have opposite views and 
think that a low search cost will not necessarily intensify 
price competition. For example, Lal and Sarvary [3] point 
out that for non-digital products under some conditions, 
consumers who search in the absence of the Internet may 
shop their familiar brands on the Internet without 
searching. Therefore, it is possible that the presence of the 
Internet not only enhances the consumer loyalty but also 
eases the price competition between firms. 
     
Before the emergence of the Internet, manufacturers 
could only sell their products to consumers in the 
traditional channels. If the channel is not vertically 
integrated, manufacturers have to contact consumers 
through retailers. In general, a manufacturer hopes that 
retailers can provide various in-store promotions for its 
product to increase its sales volume, including in-store 
advertisement, displaying its product, or even persuading 
consumers to switch to the manufacturer’s brand on the 
point of purchase. However, the retailer who maximizes 
the profits from its assortments would promote the brand 
with the highest profit margin. In fact, the retailer may 
even use the leading brand with a lower margin to build 
traffic while persuade consumers to buy another 
high-margin brand on the point of purchase. To solve the 
incentive problems, the manufacturer could choose 
exclusive dealing [5]. Exclusive dealing is a contractual 
arrangement between a manufacturer and its dealers 
where the latter agree not to carry brands competing with 
the manufacturer’s brand In contrast, under common 
agency, manufacturers allow their dealers to carry brands 
competing with their own. One stream of previous 
literature centers on how the channel structures, in 
particular, exclusive dealing or common retailer, chosen 
by competing manufacturers affect the intensity of 
competition among manufacturers. Mathewson and 
Winter [6] argue that the retailer would not accept 
exclusive dealing offered by a manufacturer unless the 
associated wholesale price is low enough, which implies 
intensive potential competition between manufacturers in 
order to be selected as the only brand carried by the 
retailer.  Others argue that under exclusive dealing, the 
perceived demands of manufacturers are more inelastic 
than under common dealership, thus softening the 
upstream competition [4] [8]. It happens because under 
exclusive dealing a manufacturer knows that the decrease 
in its wholesale price will result in not only the decrease in 
its own retail price but also the retail price of a competitive 
product set by the other exclusive dealer. In addition to the 
associated intensity of competition, cost is another 
concern when manufacturers consider whether to impose 
exclusive dealing or not. When manufacturers sell 
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products through a retailer, they would incur a setup cost. 
Under common agency, manufacturers could share the 
setup cost, thus having a positive externality compared 
with exclusive dealing. 
 
The emergence of the Internet channel may give 
manufacturers a way to overcome a retailer’s incentive 
problems. The Internet channel differs from traditional 
channels in two important ways. First, on the Internet it is 
consumers that decide what information to search and to 
retrieve. Therefore, online retailers can not 
influence/change consumers’ brand preferences as much 
as traditional retailers. Second, the Internet channel can 
not reach consumers who do not have access to the 
Internet. Manufacturers when designing their optimal 
channel strategies must take into account the distinctive 
properties of the traditional channel and the Internet 
channel into account. 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we 
analyze how the presence of the Internet may help 
manufacturers alleviate a traditional retailer’s incentive 
problems. Second, we characterize imperfectly 
competitive manufacturers’ equilibrium channel 
strategies in the presence of the Internet. 
  
 To achieve the above two objectives, we consider a 
model with two manufacturers and two traditional 
retailers. For each manufacturer’s brand, there are two 
kinds of customers, loyals and switchers. The segment of 
loyals have higher reservation price for the 
manufacturer’s brand and will not be influenced by 
traditional retailers on the point of sales. In contrast, the 
segment of switchers have lower reservation price and can 
be persuaded by traditional retailers to buy the competing 
brand. Before the emergence of the Internet, a 
manufacturer marketing strategy crucially depends on two 
factors. The concern for double marginalization, which 
determines the segments that manufacturers want to serve 
and the retailer’s persuasion power affects the choice of 
exclusive dealing or common agency. After the 
emergence of the Internet, the consumer market is 
redefined according to whether consumers have access to 
the Internet. Thus the proportion of consumers using 
Internet and the difference in cost between traditional 
channel and Internet channel would also affect the 
manufacturers’ channel design and the targeting decisions 
in different channels. This paper applies game theory to 
study the strategic interactions between rational 
manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, and it generates 
the following results: 
1. The presence of the Internet allows imperfectly 
competitive manufacturers to better coordinate their 
pricing, targeting, and channel strategies, thereby 
minimizing the agency costs involved in common dealing 
at the traditional outlets, which in turn enhances the 
manufacturers’ profits. 
2. Exclusive dealing may and may not become more 
prevalent in the presence of the Internet. It all depends on 
the ratio of the population of switchers to the entire 
population of consumers. 
3. The presence of the Internet allows a monopolistic 
manufacturer to screen consumers by serving different 
people at different outlets. Screening is less effective, 
however, in the case of imperfect competition, a dynamic 
adjustment process is obtained which describes how a 
manufacturer should optimally change his channel and 
pricing strategies when the population of the Internet 
purchasers grows over time. 
 
2. Literature Review 
One of The issues that attract many researchers’ 
attention after the prevalence of the Internet is how the 
Internet affects the intensity of competition among firms. 
Although some scholars (eg, Lal and Sarvary, 1999) argue 
that the non-digital attributes of products may influence 
consumer behavior, which are decided by the concern of 
extra transaction cost, and cause the favor of existing 
brand. According to this argue, the firm will face better 
pricing condition. Nevertheless, most people agree that 
the development of the Internet has reduced searching 
cost and made consumers get information easily, which 
will lead price competition and sharply reduce price level. 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) have empirically studied 
the price competition in two categories - CD and books – 
to exam whether the price competition on Internet would 
be more severe than the traditional channel. CD and books 
are both highly homogeneous products, which means that 
the product quality will not vary within different channels. 
The result shows that the product prices on web are lower 
than on brick, which means that pricing wars are more 
intensely on virtual world. Besides, the shift scale of price 
on web store is 1% of it on physical store, which means 
that the Internet trades possess lower menu cost and are 
more sensitive on price. Interestingly, the price dispersion 
among web retailer is larger than which among 
conventional retailer, and the leading firms in CD and 
books market are not the one who marked the lowest price. 
Firms adopt low price strategy shared few market value, 
which means purchasing cost is not the only concern of 
buying decisions even there are homogenous products. 
The degree of trust in website, brand, and service are 
important to buying decisions. Consequently, the 
homogenous products may not necessarily lead to 
competition on price on virtual channel. 
 
Exclusive dealing is a commitment between 
manufacturer and retailer thatretailers agree not to carry 
the competing brands. That means a manufacturer 
requires its retailers only to sellits products. The issues of 
exclusive dealing in the past researches can be categorized 
into three types: one is the impact of exclusive dealing to 
social welfare; two is the equilibrium channel structure, 
including exclusive dealing, common dealing, and vertical 
integration; three is how other marketing variables, like 
price and promotion, change under different channel 
structure. 
O’Brien and Shaffer (1993) correct Lin’s (1990) 
error and argue that manufacturers eventually choose 
exclusive dealing as its channel structure among exclusive 
dealing, common dealing and vertical integration. In their 
setting, the competition at retail level is monopoly and 
duopoly under common agency and exclusive dealing 
respectively. For this reason, common agency gives the 
retailer the power to threat manufacturers to sell only one 
products. Therefore, manufacturers could not extract all 
profits under common agency but could under exclusive 
dealing. In addition, manufacturers can alleviate 
competition through retailers, thus it is optimal for 
manufacturers to choose exclusive dealing. It is worthy to 
notice that the retailer’s pricing strategy with common 
agency is like product line pricing, so the consumer 
surplus will be extracted at most. Compared to exclusive 
dealing, consumer surplus under common agency is even 
lower. 
 
Many studies do not consider vertical integration, 
and they only focus on the manufacturers’ choice between 
exclusive dealing and common agency. Bernheim and 
Whinston (1985) model the retail competition as perfect 
competition and the retail prices are set by manufacturers. 
It results the manufacturer would delegate some 
marketing decisions to common agency in order to collude 
with each other. That is because common agency provides 
an indirect mechanism through which competing 
manufacturers may “sell out” to a single retailer, thereby 
creating incentives which generate a collusive outcome. It 
is worth to note that the results critically depend on that 
the manufacturer has the power to set retail price. 
 
Besides Bernheim and Whinston, Besanko and Perry 
(1993) also model perfect competition at retail level. They 
continue Marvel’s (1982) study on free-rider problem. 
Marvel indicates that a manufacturer can solve the 
free-rider problem through exclusive dealing. For a 
leading brand manufacturer, it must invest much money 
on advertisements to let consumers aware its brand and 
purchase in advance. When consumers come to the 
retailer’s outlet, they may be attracted by other competing 
brands because of the low prices, thus a strange 
phenomenon that the manufacturer invests but increases 
the competitor’s sales arises. After the leading 
manufacturer chooses exclusive dealing, the incentive 
problem disappears and the benefits of advertisements are 
surely owned by the manufacturer itself. 
 
Besanko and Perry transform the free-rider problem 
into interbrand externality. Interbrand externality is that 
when manufacturers are common agency, the benefits of 
their investments are shared with each other, and hence 
the effect is two-sided not one-sided like Marvel’s. Their 
study explores that manufacturers would use exclusive 
dealing if the costs of investment were not too high. 
Because a manufacturer possesses whole benefits of the 
investment, it induces to spend more money on 
advertisements and the competition is thus more intensive. 
The results in O’Brien and Shaffer or Bernheim and 
Whinston implicate that the channel structure in the 
market is unique, but Besanko and Perry allow different 
equilibrium under different conditions, and it is closer to 
the real world. They also prove that exclusive dealing 
could maximize the social welfare under and thereby it is 
not right to forbid exclusive dealing from the view of 
social welfare. 
 
Mathewson and Winter (1987) considers a 
asymmetric market, where manufacturers have different 
marginal production cost and the retailer is a monopoly. 
Because the retailer is monopoly, manufacturers have to 
compete on wholesale price if they want to impose 
exclusive dealing. They argue that when the cost has big 
difference, the dominant manufacturer, with lower 
marginal cost, could guarantee itself the market by 
imposing exclusive dealing without its wholesale price 
declining too much. Thus, the equilibrium is exclusive 
dealing. Obviously, Mathewson and Winter also allow 
different channel equilibrium in different marketing 
environment. 
 
Lal and Villas-Boas (1996) consider a more general 
model, where manufacturers and retailers are all duopoly. 
In their model, the situation that one retailer distributes 
one product and the other retailer distributes both products 
may arise, so the intrabrand competition is under 
consideration. They argue that if the retailer-loyal 
segment is not too large, manufacturers both choose 
common agency. That is because if the retailer-loyal 
segment is too large, it provide higher incentive to 
decrease wholesale price. 
 
There are three contributions in our study. First, we 
introduce multiple marketing channel in discussing 
exclusive dealing and common agency. Because retailers 
have different marketing power and consumers have 
different ability to access the Internet in different channel, 
it gives manufacturers a chance to screen by channels. The 
idea is that manufacturers should induce different 
segments to shop in different channels. When the 
consumer structure in a channel is more homogenous, the 
competition between manufacturers decreases and it leads 
them to be more profitable.  Second, given the level of 
externality, the equilibrium is not thus unique. In Besanko 
and Perry’s (1993) study, they use the share of investment 
to express externality, and once the level of externality is 
given, we could know the equilibrium channel structure. 
In our study, we use the setup cost to express the 
externality, and even the level of externality is high, 
manufacturers may not choose common agency 
eventually. That is because we consider the retailer’s 
ability of persuasion. Because a retailer could persuade 
consumers to purchase some brands, manufacturers would 
lower wholesale price to induce the retailer to persuade for 
him, and it leads to intensive competition under common 
agency. By using the characteristic that retailers have 
different persuasion power in different channel, we can 
show that the level of externality is not enough to decide 
the equilibrium. Third, the discussions about the 
preferences of exclusive dealing or common dealing are 
short of consideration of the cost difference. It implies that 
the cost of two kinds of dealing is the same (Lin, 1990; 
O’Brien & Shaffer, 1993). Marvel (1982) and Besanko & 
Perry (1993) take the advertisement cost into account. 
Although the exclusive dealing will raise the 
manufacturers’ investment on advertisement and common 
dealing will ease off such competition for the reason of 
external effect, they also assume that the advertising costs 
are indifferent between exclusive dealing and common 
dealing. Our study argues that the establishments of each 
retail outlet will have a fixed cost. It can be shared if 
manufactures choose common dealing but not for the 
exclusive dealings case. It means that manufactures 
should consider the different costs between exclusive 
dealing and common dealing. 
 
3. Model 
In the market, there are two manufactures, 
manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2, producing brand 1 
and brand 2, respectively. In this article, we sometimes use 
N1 and N2 to represent manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2. 
Assume the production cost is 0 for both manufacturers 
without loss of generality. The population of consumers is 
normalized to 1, including 4 segments: (1) Segment G1: it 
consists of consumers who are loyal to brand 1 and have 
their reservation prices for brand 1 and brand 2 equal to H 
and 0, respectively. The proportion of this segment is 
(1-q)/2. (2) Segment B1: it consists of consumers who are 
the switchers of brand 1 and have their reservation prices 
for brand 1 and brand 2 equal to M and L, respectively. 
The proportion of this segment is q/2. (3) Segment G2: it 
consists of consumers who are loyal to brand 2 and have 
their reservation prices for brand 1 and brand 2 equal to 0 
and H, respectively. The proportion of this segment is 
(1-q)/2. (4) Segment B2: it consists of consumers who are 
the switchers of brand 2 and have their reservation prices 
for brand 1 and brand 2 equal to L and M, respectively. 
The proportion of this segment is q/2. Let H > M > L > 0 
and 0≦q≦1. 
 
From the discussion in section 2, we know the 
competition among online retailers on the net is more 
intensive than the traditional channel in general. Thus, we 
assume there are two retailers R1, R2 in the traditional 
channel, but there are many potential retailers on the 
Internet. Especially, only the retailers in the traditional 
channels have the ability to persuade consumers and 
change their preferences. A retailer can persuade 
consumers in B1 or B2 to buy their less preferred brand by 
incurring a persuasion cost C and raising their reservation 
price for their less preferred brand from L to M. in contrast, 
consumers in G1 and G2 can not be influenced by the 
retailer’s persuasion effort. To highlight the importance of 
persuasion power of retailers at the traditional channels, 
we let L=0.After emergence of the Internet, a part of 
consumers have the ability to shop on the net. Let αG and 
αB be the proportions of the Internet users in the segment 
of loyals and in the segment of switchers, respectively.  
 
The sequence of the game can be described as 
follows. First, the two manufacturers simultaneously 
decide which distribution channel(s) to use. Then they 
simultaneously choose only one retailer to sell their 
product for each chosen distribution channel. Then the 
contacted retailers accept or reject manufacturers’ offers. 
Whenever the two manufacturers choose the same retailer 
to distribute their products, the common dealership occurs; 
otherwise, manufacturers adopt exclusive dealing.  Then 
manufacturers set their wholesale prices and given the 
wholesale prices retailers set their retail prices. l1 As for 
the Internet channel, since there are many potential online 
retailers who will offer attractive contract in order to 
obtain the dealership from manufacturers. As a result, the 
retailer who gets the dealing right can not charge any retail 
price higher than its marginal price.  
 
Denote the cost of setting up a retail outlet in the 
traditional channel by KT and on the Internet be KE. R1 and 
R2 set retail prices P1, P2 given the wholesale prices w1 and 
w2, and decide whether to influence a consumer’s 
purchase decision by incurring a persuasion cost C. 
Besides, online retailers persuade consumers, which 
implies that the persuasion cost on Internet is assumed to 
be infinite. 
 
Before shopping, consumers know the selling prices 
and their reservation prices of the two brands, and they 
seek to maximize their consumer surplus when choosing 
the product to buy. Consumers make their brand choice on 
the point of sales, which may be influenced by the retailer 
they shop at. To focus on the impact of the Internet on 
manufacturers’ channel strategies, we deliberately 
abstract from the effect of consumer’s differing 
preferences towards different distribution channels by 
assuming that the shopping cost of consumers at 
traditional channels is the same as on the Net and is equal 
to 0. 
 
                                                          
In what follows we use (Xi,Yj) to denote  an 
equilibrium where X-type consumers are served in the 
traditional channel and Y-type consumers are served on 
the Internet and i (j) indicates the type of dealership 
adopted in the traditional channel (Internet channel , 
respectively), either exclusive dealing (denoted by E) or 
common dealing (denoted by C).  
The game proceeds as follow: 
1. N1, N2 choose exclusive dealing or common dealing. 
2. After the determination of channel structure, N1, N2  
set wholesale price w1, w2. 
3. R1, R2 set retail price P1, P2. 
4. Consumers choose shopping channel 
1 This formulation is similar to that of Lin [4] and O’Brien 
& Shaffer [8.] 
5. The retailer chooses whether to persuade. 
6. Consumers choose brand. 
Before the emergence of Internet 
Before the emergence of the Internet, the manufactures 
have to decide whether to distribute their product through 
the same retailer (i.e., common dealing) or different 
retailers (i.e., exclusive dealing), and which segments of 
consumers to target. Through exclusive dealing, 
manufactures are able to avoid the intensive price 
competition resulting from the retailer’s incentive 
problem. Through common dealing, manufacturers can 
share the setup cost. Since manufactures are symmetric in 
every aspect, the equilibrium is also symmetric. The four 
possible equilibria are as follows: 
1. Equilibrium (GC,0): Both manufacturers only serve 
their respective loyals through a common retailer (N1→
(G1,0)；N2→(G2,0)). 
In equilibrium, the wholesale prices are set at the 
loyals’ reservation price H, and so are the retail prices. In 
the equilibrium, the loyals’ consumer surplus is 
completely extracted as in the monopoly case. The total 
channel profits are accrued to the manufacture and equal 
to . 2/2/)1(21 T
MM KHq −−== ππ
2. Equilibrium (AC,0): Both manufacturers serve all 
consumers in their respective markets through the 
common retailer (N1→(G1+B1,0)；N2→(G2+B2,0)). 
 First note that in order to induce the retailer to serve 
all consumers in manufacturers’ respective market by 
setting the retail price at M, manufacturers would set their 
wholesale prices satisfying (  
. The condition ensures that the retailer 
obtains higher profits when serving each manufacturer’s 
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Now we need identify the condition under which it is 
not profitable for each manufacturer to attract its rival’s 
switchers by lowering its wholesale price and thus sustain 
the above equilibrium. To this end, we shall first derive the 
wholesale price that induces the retailer to switch 
consumers for the deviating manufacturer and then show 
that the resulting manufacturer profit is lower than staying 
in the equilibrium. When one manufacturer, say N1, 
deviates by lowering w1, the condition, 
, must be satisfied in order to induce the retailer to incur a 
cost C and persuade manufacturer 2’s switchers to buy 
brand 1. Thus manufacturer 1 has to lower his wholesale 
price until w  in order to 
induce the retailer to switch his rival’s consumers to buy 
brand 1. Finally, manufacturer 1 would prefer staying in 
the equilibrium to deviating if the condition, 
, 
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By (3-1), when the persuasion cost is high enough, 
both manufacturers will be content with their own 
customers, making it possible to sustain the equilibrium 
(AC,0), the manufacturer’s profits in this equilibrium are 
. When 
condition (3-1) does not hold, once the manufacturers 
choose the same retailer, they will compete with each 
other on the basis of the wholesale prices to obtain the 
retailer’s support, as will be shown in the fourth possible 
equilibrium.  
2/2/)1(21 T
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3. Equilibrium (AE,0): Both manufacturers serve all 
consumers in their respective markets through their own 
exclusive retailer (N1→(G1+B1,0)；N2→(G2+B2,0)) 
When each manufacturer serves consumers through 
their exclusive retailer, he does not need to worry about 
the retailer’s persuasion power. Therefore, his pricing 
strategy is the same as in the monopoly case with the 
wholesale price equal to 
.  qHqMww /])1([21 −−==
4. Mixed strategy equilibrium: both manufacturers 
mixed pricing strategy through common dealing 
  When (3-1) does not hold, for example, when the 
proportion of switchers (q) is high or/and the persuasion 
cost is low enough neither manufacturer will content 
himself with serving his own customers. Each 
manufacturer would like to attract his rival’s switchers 
through the retailer’s persuasion power by offering a more 
attractive wholesale price to the retailer, thus resulting in a 
severe price competition between manufacturers. On the 
other hand, each manufacturer can guarantee a marginal 
profit ( by serving his own loyals only. Thus 
the manufacturer will not cut his price lower than 
 to attract his rival’s switchers for in 
the latter case the resulting manufacturer profits 
 are lower than in the 
former case. In fact, in the same spirit of Varian [9] and 
Narasimhan [7], there exists only the mixed strategy 
equilibrium where each manufacturer randomizes his 
wholesale price according to a distribution function. The 
manufacturer whose wholesale price turns out to be more 
attractive would succeed in obtaining the retailer’s 
support in attracting his rival’s customers for him. In this 
mixed strategy equilibrium, the expected profits for each 
manufacturer are , 
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Proposition 1: Let the reservation price of the 
loyals’ be 1 and that of the switchers’ be k (0≦k≦1). 
Suppose that the setup cost in the traditional channel 
is the same as on the Internet, i.e. K . KK ET ==
(3-1) 
Before the emergence of the Internet, the respective 
conditions for each equilibrium to occur are as 
follows: 
 
Equilibrium Equilibrium conditions 
)0,( CG  21 qk −≤  
 
























Table 1  The equilibrium conditions before the emergence 
of the Internet 
 
The conditions above are derived from the following 
logic. To sustain equilibrium, the equilibrium profits have 
to be larger than any other profits that are derived from 
other possible strategies. Take equilibrium (AC,0) as an 
example. When manufacturers are in this equilibrium, 
they have no incentives to serve their respective loyals and 
to induce the retailer to persuade consumers to buy his 
brand. The former condition is equal to satisfy 
, and the later condition is equal to satisfy 
. As a result, the two 
inequalities are the conditions to sustain equilibrium 
(A
21 qk −≥
qk 1([ −≤ qCqq /])1(2) ++
C,0). We can infer other equilibrium conditions by the 



























By Figure 1, it is easy to show that which equilibrium 
happens depends on the switchers’ value. When there are 
more switchers in the market or their reservation price is 
higher, we can say the switcher is more valuable. When 
the switcher is not so valuable, manufacturer wants to set 
the highest wholesale price H to serve the loyals only, it 
leads to equilibrium (GC,0). When the switcher’s value is 
higher but not too high, manufacturers have the incentives 
to serve all his own consumers but not the rival’s 
switchers, so they can share a retail outlet peacefully and it 
is the equilibrium (AC,0). When the switcher’s value is too 
high, if manufacturers choose a common retailer, both of 
them can not satisfy with serving their own customers 
only, and it means they will have more intensive price 
competition. Thus, they are will to have more setup cost to 
avoid such price competition. 
 
After the emergence of the Internet 
After the emergence of the Internet, two things are 
different from before. First, manufacturers can sell 
products through the Internet channel where retailers have 
much less influence on consumers’ preference than in the 
traditional channel. Second, as mentioned in the model, 
not all consumers can access the Internet and thus the 
proportions of the Internet users in the segment of loyals 
(denoted byαG) and in the segment of switchers (denoted 
by αB) would determine the structure of the consumer 
market and hence the manufacturer’s optimal channel 
strategy. The following lemma shows that manufacturers 
will choose common dealing whenever they sell products 
on the Net.  
 
The problems facing each manufacturer include 
whether to sell his product through the traditional channel, 
the Internet channel or both, for each distribution channel 
whether to choose the common dealing or exclusive 
dealing, and whether to serve his loyals only or switchers 
as well. There are eight possible symmetric pure strategy 
equilibriums when manufacturers can distribute their 
products either through the traditional channel or the 
Internet channel. We describe them in the following. 
1. Equilibrium (GC,0): both manufacturers only serve 
the loyals in the traditional channel through common 
dealing (N1→(G1,0)；N2→(G2,0)). Figure 1  The equilibriums before the emergence 
of the Internet 
2. Equilibrium (AC,0): both manufacturers serve all 
consumers in the traditional channel through common 
dealing (N1→(G1+B1,0)；N2→(G2+B2,0)). 
Note: 
1: Equilibrium (GC,0);        2: Equilibrium (AC,0); 
3: Equilibrium (AE,0);        4: Mixed Equilibrium 
Γ1:  
21 qk −=
Γ2:  qCqqqk /])1(2)1([ ++−=
Γ3:  Kqqk +−=
21
X-axis: q; Y-axis: k 
3. Equilibrium (AE,0): both manufacturers serve all 
consumers in the traditional channel through exclusive 
dealing (N1→(G1+B1,0)；N2→(G2+B2,0)). 
4. Equilibrium (0, GC): both manufacturers only serve 
their loyals on the Internet through common dealing. 
In the above equilibrium, manufacturers set the 
wholesale prices at the loyals’ reservation price H and so 
do retailers set the retail prices.  The profits of 
manufacturers are . 2/2/)1(21 EL
MM KHq −−== αππ
5. Equilibrium (0, AC): both manufacturers serve all 
consumers on the Internet through common dealing 
Because the retail market on the Internet is competitive, 
retailers can not charge any price higher than their 
marginal cost, i.e., the wholesale price charged by the 
manufacturers. As a result, the manufacturer can serve all 
consumers who can access the Internet in his protected 
market by setting his wholesale price at the switchers’ 
reservation price M.  The profits of manufacturers equal 
2/2/])1[(21 ESL
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6. Equilibrium (GC, AC): both manufacturers sell their 
products through the two distribution channels under 
common dealing. The manufacturers induce all their 
customers who can access the Internet to buy their 
products on the Net and serve their loyals who can not 
access the Internet in the traditional channel. 
In equilibrium (GC, AC), each manufacturer would 
like to serve his switchers on the Net and thus sets his 
wholesale price at M. Given this wholesale price, the 
online retailer would set the retail price also at M (again 
because of competition) while the traditional common 
retailer would set the retail price at H. Facing the two 
different retail prices, all consumers who can access the 
Internet would buy their preferred brand on the Net by 
paying a cheaper price and only the loyals who can not 
access the Internet buy their preferred brand from the 
traditional retailer. The manufacturer’s profits are 
. 2/)(2/])1[(21 ETS
MM KKMqq +−+−== αππ
7. Equilibrium (AC, AC): both manufacturers sell their 
products through the two distribution channels under 
common dealing. The manufacturers induce all their 
customers who can access the Internet to buy their 
products on the Net and serve their remaining customers 
in the traditional channel.  
When the consumers who can access the Internet are 
induced to the Net, the structure of remaining consumers 
in the traditional channel would change. To serve all 
consumers that stay in the traditional channel, the 
manufacturers would set their wholesale prices at 
to ensure 
the common retailer the same profits as those when 
serving the loyals only. This wholesale price is positively 
related to α
)1(/))(1)(1( BG qMHqM αα −−−−−
BαG and negatively related to .With the 
similar reasoning used in deriving (2-1), we can derive the 
following lower bound for the retailer’s persuading costs 














8. Equilibrium (AE, AC): serve all consumers with 
common dealing on the Internet and with exclusive 
dealing in the traditional channel. 
If (3-2) is not satisfied, it means that when 
manufacturers adopt the strategy S(AC,AC), they would 
have incentives to attract the competitor’s switchers 
through the retailer’s persuading, thus breaking  the 
equilibrium (AC, AC). When the proportion of the loyals 
who can access the Internet is higher than that of the 
switchers, inducing all Internet users to buy on the Net 
would lead the proportion of the switchers in the 
traditional channel relative to that of the loyals increases. 
Therefore, if manufacturers choose S(AC,AC), 
manufacturers would compete aggressively on their 
wholesale prices with the hope that the common retailer 
can attract their rival’s switchers for them. To avoid such 
competition, manufacturers may choose exclusive dealing 
in the traditional channel, resulting in the equilibrium (AE, 
AC). 
 
Proposition 2: Let the reservation price of the 
loyals be 1 and that of the switchers’ be k (0≦k≦1). 
Suppose that the setup cost in the traditional channel 
is the same as that in the Internet channel, i.e., 
. After the emergence of Internet, the 
conditions for equilibrium (G
KKK ET ==
C,0) to occur are as 
follows:2 
Follow the same logic as in proposition 1. When a 
equilibrium is sustained, the profits derived from other 
strategies are always less than the equilibrium profits. 
Take equilibrium (GC,0) as an example. A manufacturer 
has five possible alternative strategies. One is to serve all 
consumers in the traditional channel; two is to serve the 
loyals on the net; three is to serve all consumers on the net; 
four is to serve the loyals in the traditional channel and all 
consumers on the net; five is to serve all consumers in 
both channel. Compare the equilibrium profits with others 
derived from these strategies, and then we can get the 
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Corollary 2-1: Keep the preferences and 
proportions of the loyals and the switchers constant. 
Suppose that the proportion of consumers who are 
able to access the Internet increases over time. Then 
the manufacturers’ equilibrium distribution strategy 
will be dynamically adapted to the proportions of 
Internet loyals and Internet switchers.  
 
Keeping other parameters constant, figure 2 shows 
that how the manufacturers’ equilibrium distribution 
strategy varies with αG and αB. Before the emergence of 
the Internet (or equivalently, when both αG and αB equal 
zero), depending on the importance of switchers 
(represented by the size of k) and the retailer’s persuasion 
cost, the equilibrium could be (GC,0), (AC,0) or (AE,0), 
which correspond to equilibrium 1, equilibrium 1’ and 
equilibrium 1’’ in the three graphs, respectively. With the 
increase in the proportion of Internet users, the 
equilibrium distribution strategy will be dynamically 
adjusted. The way in which the equilibrium distribution 
strategy adjusted crucially depends on the relative sizes of 
αG and αB. Two cases can be distinguished: the case 
whereαG ≦ αB, and the case where αG ≧ αB. 
 
In the case where αG ≦αB, as shown by the path A 
in figure 2, with the emergence of the Internet, the 
distribution equilibrium may change from equilibrium (AE, 
0) into (GC,AC) as long as αB is high enough relative to α
G. The manufacturer by expanding into the Internet 
channel, can induce a relatively higher proportion of 
switchers to buy his product on the Net, which enables 
him to serve only the loyal non-Internet users in the 
traditional channel and thus do not need worry about the 
traditional retailer’s incentive problem of switching his 
customers. When αB is high enough relative to αG, the 
benefit from alleviating the retailer’s incentive problem 
will outweigh the loss of the non-Internet users in the 
segment of switchers, thus leading to the equilibrium 
(GC,AC) . As more and more consumers can access the 








In the case where αG ≧αB, as shown by the path B 
in figure 2, with the emergence of the Internet and the 
increase in the proportion of the Internet users, the 
distribution equilibrium may change from equilibrium 
(AC, 0) first into (AE, AC), and finally into (AC,AC) as long 
as αB is high enough relative to αG. The manufacturer by 
expanding into the Internet channel, can induce a 
relatively higher proportion of loyals to buy his product 
on the Net, which aggravates the retailer’s incentive 
problem of stealing customers but mitigating the 
manufacturer’s concern for double-marginalization. The 
latter benefit will outweigh the former cost when αB is 
small enough relative to α G, thus resulting in the 
equilibrium (AE, AC). In other words, the manufacturer 
uses exclusive dealing to overcome the traditional 
retailer’s incentive problem and alleviate the 
double-marginalization problem by mitigating loyals to 
the Internet channel. When the proportion of Internet 
users in the segment of switchers keeps increasing, it 
becomes less desirable for either manufacturer to induce 
the retailer to persuade customers and hence the 
equilibrium changes into (AC,AC). As more and more 
consumers can access the Internet, (0,AC) becomes the 
limiting equilibrium. 
 
Corollary 2-2: Whether common dealing becomes 
more prevalent after the emergence of the Internet 
crucially depends on the structure of the consumer 
market, in particular, the importance of loyal 
switchers, and the proportions of Internet users in the 




1. If k  and k , 
common dealing becomes more prevalent in the 
presence of the Internet channel; 
Kqq +−≥ 21 qCqqq /])1(2)1([ ++−≥
2. If 1  or  
, exclusive becomes more prevalent 
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Figure 2  The equilibrium after the emergence of the 
Internet 
Note: 
1. Equilibrium: 1: (GC,0); 1’: (AC,0); 1’’: (AE,0); 2: 
(GC,AC); 3: (AE,AC); 4: (AC,AC); 5: (0,AC) 
2. X-axis:αB ; Y-axis:αG 
3. Path A: more switchers can access the Internet than 
the loyals; 
  Path B: more loyals can access the Internet than the 
switchers 
4. Parameter value: k=0.35, 0.4, 0.8 (from left to 
right); q=0.8; C=0.05; K=0.05 
dealing to exclusive dealing both in the absence and in 
the presence of the Internet channel. 
 
Proof. The above corollary is derived by comparing the 
equilibria before the emergence of the Internet channel 
with those after. 
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